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Clarity and Doubt: Derrida Among the Palestinians 
 
In the right hand column of Glas, Derrida offers the following paragraphs: 
 
Not to arrest the career of a Genet. For the first time I am afraid, while 
writing, as they say ‘on’ someone, of being read by him. Not to arrest 
him, not to draw him back, not to bridle him. Yesterday he let me know 
that he was in Beirut, among the Palestinians at war, encircled outcasts. I 
know that what interests me always takes (its/his) place over there, but 
how to show that? [Je sais que ce qui m’intéresse a toujours (son) lieu là-
bas, mais comment le montrer?] He almost never writes anymore, he has 
interred [enterré] literature like no one, he leaps [saute] wherever that 
explodes [ça saute] in the world, wherever the absolute knowledge of 
Europe takes a blow [coup], and these (hi)stories of glas, seing, flower, 
horse ought to make him shit. 
 
How right he is. This is what I want to show by deporting you as swiftly 
as possible to the limits of a basin, a sea, where there arrive for an 
interminable war the Greek, the Jew, the Arab, the Hispano-Moor. Which 
I am also (following), by the trace [Que je suis aussi, à la trace].1 
 
 
Writing in 1974 in the year that the Arab League recognized the PLO as the ‘sole, 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’, just 12 months after the Yom 
Kippur War, and with memories of the Black September of 1970 still fresh in the 
memory, these paragraphs carry a certain weight and interest for us today, if we seek 
to address the question: what remains of Glas? Genet’s engagement with the question 
of Palestine is well known, and recovered in his final work Prisoner of Love2, while 
the question of the Jew is a massively legible stake in the left-hand column of Glas 
and the wider corpus of Derrida, along with the philosophical memes of, say, 
sovereignty, the nation-state, the Abrahamic, Europe, sacrifice and so on. In this 
decisive moment of autobiographical concentration from 1974 we can see how the 
text of Glas might be said to inhabit and irrigate the entire text of Derrida and how 
within that the queerest of Derrida’s friendships, the one with Genet, opens out onto 
the wider concerns of Derrida’s thought and writing. 
 
It is in this context that I would like to interrogate Derrida’s own question in this 
passage: ‘I know that what interests me always takes (its/his) place over there, but 
how to show that?’ What does it mean for Derrida to offer such a sentence: ‘what 
interests me’ [his philosophical and political interests?] always [without fail or 
exception?] takes (its/his) place over there’? The French pronoun son offers both 
possibilities that what interests Derrida always takes place over there, and, what 
interests Derrida always happens to Genet among the Palestinians. It may be more 
normative to read the phrase as ‘takes its place’ but Derrida’s own parenthesis insists 
on the alternative. But how would one begin to show that? One could choose to 
demonstrate it through a set of textual and biographical references, say, or, one could 
choose to find another method for thinking through the Derrida-Genet relation and the 
Derrida-Genet-Palestine-Israel relation, without arresting it, without drawing it back 
or retarding its progress or shackling it with a bridle for some other utilitarian or pre-
programmed purpose. How might it be possible in reading this passage to resist the 
impulse to put the Genet back in the bottle and to inter it, neither as a prisoner of love 
nor buried under ground in a grave or a cave of wonders? How to interrogate the 
question without interring it? 
 
One legitimate strategy would be the elaboration of a personal history as an act of 
critical biography which laid out the facts of the interaction between Genet and 
Derrida, such as those offered by Edward Said in his essay on Genet’s late writing: 
I recall that once during the evening he [Genet] said something very 
positive and surprisingly warm about Jacques Derrida—‘un copain,’ 
remarked Genet—whom I had thought of as a quietist Heideggerian type 
at the time; Glas had not yet been published, and it was only six months 
later, when Mariam, our little son, and I spent a few weeks in Paris in 
April 1973, that I learned from Derrida himself that his friendship with 
Genet had been sealed as the two of them watched soccer matches 
together.3 
 
In his biography of Genet, Edmund White notes that at this time Genet was dating a 
Moroccan soccer player who played for a French team, and whose career he followed 
with keen interest. White also recounts that in the Spring of 1972 Genet had 
attempted, unsuccessfully, ‘to put together a book devoted to the Palestinian 
revolution, to be written collectively by Philippe Sollers, Jacques Henric, Paule 
Thévenin, Roland Barthes, Juan Goytisolo, Pierre Goyotat and Jacques Derrida. 
Genet’s idea was that all these men would go to the Middle East for a while, and then 
write a book about their experiences’.4 This exercise in collective ‘method writing’ 
did not happen but its possibility is suggestive of Derrida’s interest in the place of 
Palestine and Genet’s activities there, ‘il saute partout où ça sauté dans le monde’, one 
of those places of the world that is ‘jumping’. 
 
An exercise such as this would have its value and should be pursued. However, the 
wording of these paragraphs in Glas point towards another horizon. The question is 
not necessarily whether Derrida agreed with all of Genet’s positions or if his activities 
among the Palestinians mapped exactly onto Derrida’s interests. In this sense we must 
ask, what is an interest? There is a difference between the things that are interesting to 
me and the things that are my interests, my vested interests and things that are in my 
best interest. Which of these register of interests, these special interests, these rates of 
interest, are referred to here in the sentence: ‘I know that what interests me always 
takes (its/his) place over there.’ Benoit Peeters writes in his biography of Derrida’s 
interest in Israel-Palestine: 
 
Derrida wrote to [Levinas] on 6 June 1967, just after the outbreak of what 
would soon be called the Six-Day War. ‘Glued to the radio’ since the start 
of the conflict, he admitted that he had for some time been ‘obsessed by 
what was happening over in Israel’. This certainly helped to bring him 
closer to Levinas.5 
 
If it is true that the question of Palestine-Israel is more of an obsession than an interest 
for Derrida, then it would follow that another legitimate strategy for ‘how to show’ 
the career of Derrida among the Palestinians would be the riskier and altogether more 
‘radical’ gesture of actually reading what Derrida has to say on this topic, noting that 
this articulation from 1974 is historically specific to his then friendship with Genet 
but bears a relation to other declarations that Derrida later offered on this issue. In so 
doing, one might not suggest anything as bold as a reading or even a deconstruction 
of what Derrida might have to say on Palestine. It might be enough at this stage to 
offer a space in which the clarity of what interests Derrida can be allowed to resound. 
The question of clarity will be a not inconsiderable stake in the discussion of Israel-
Palestine by Derrida, although there may not be a choice to be made between the 
clarity of Derrida’s public pronouncements on Palestine and the seeming complexity 
of Glas, as if clarity were not a complex thing to negotiate. 
 
For example, one might begin with the comments published at the beginning of 
‘Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German’ first delivered as a lecture in 
Jerusalem in 1988, which describe the spirit in which Derrida agreed to participate in 
the symposium and in others, ‘in the occupied territories, with Palestinian colleagues, 
outside of their universities which were then, and still are, closed by administrative 
decision (on July 15, 1988)’.6 In this preamble Derrida says (and one might take these 
words to be definitive of a position): 
I had already communicated my anxiety to the organizers of this meeting. 
I had expressed to them my wish to participate in a conference where 
Arab and Palestinian colleagues would be officially invited and actively 
involved. The organizers of this meeting, Professors Sanford Budick and 
Wolfgang Iser, shared my concern. I thank them for the understanding 
they have shown in this regard. With all the gravity this requires, I wish to 
state right now my solidarity with all those, in this land, who demand an 
end to violence, those who condemn the crimes of terrorism, of military 
and police repression, and those who advocate the withdrawal of Israeli 
troops from the occupied territories as well as the recognition of the 
Palestinian’s right to choose their own representatives for negotiations 
that are now more indispensable than ever. This cannot be accomplished 
without ceaseless, well-informed, courageous reflection. This reflection 
should lead to new, or not so new, interpretations of what—two years ago, 
while this conference was being planned here—I had proposed to call the 
‘institutions of interpretation’. But that same reflection should also lead us 
to interpret the dominant institution that is the state, here the Israeli state 
(whose existence, it goes without saying, must henceforth be recognized 
by all and definitively guaranteed), along with its prehistory, the 
conditions of its recent founding, and the constitutional, legal, political 
foundations of its present functioning, the forms and limits of its self-
interpretation, and so forth. (241) 
He goes on to say that this declaration arises not only from a concern for justice and 
out of friendship for both Palestinian and Israeli colleagues but ‘it is meant also as an 
expression of respect for a certain image of Israel and as an expression of hope for its 
future’ (242). He notes that such ‘courageous’ historical reflection on the idea of 
Israel and its future is ‘inscribed in the most strictly determining context of our 
meeting. It constitutes in my view its very meaning—and its urgency’. 
 
This passage offers in as plain an idiom as one will find in the whole of Derrida 
(certainly in contrast, say, to either column of Glas) a statement of an interest, in 
every possible sense, that is always urgent. It might be summarized as a refusal of all 
positions of violent totalitarianism, the affirmation of Palestinian self-determination, 
an unconditional guarantee of the state of Israel, and the recovery of a ‘certain image’ 
of the socialist origins of the Israeli state in contrast to its present militarized and 
oppressive form. This considered, relatively late, position on the part of Derrida may 
or may not map onto the articulations of Genet in his writing from the 1970s and early 
1980s. One should not take the fact of a friendship as proof of a political or 
intellectual correlation, or even of a confluence of interests.  
 
There would be much to pick out here before passing on but to go too quickly, in 
order to develop Derrida’s position, one might look to the conversation with Elizabeth 
Roudinesco, ‘Of the Anti-Semitism to Come’ in For What Tomorrow…. Here he 
offers the following, which again should be quoted at length: 
An anecdote: Some time ago, someone I didn’t know called me on the 
telephone. From the Centre de Documentation Juive: ‘My son is writing a 
thesis on Israel at the Sorbonne. He heard that you were in Tel Aviv two 
years ago and that you gave a “speech” which the Israeli press reported 
on. He would like to get a copy.’ I didn’t give a lecture in Tel Aviv, I told 
her; rather I spoke, in front of a large audience and as part of a discussion, 
about what I thought of the situation and the political stakes, and notably 
what I disapproved of in Israeli politics. I did so carefully, politely, I 
believe, but frankly and firmly. Since I had no legible trace of this 
improvisation, aside from a brief introduction, I told my interlocutor that 
if her son was interested in what I think of Israel he could find what he’s 
looking for in certain texts of mine [MMQ’s italics]. In general, I added, 
although the conditions of the foundation of the state of Israel remain for 
me a tangled knot of painful questions that I could not possibly address 
over the phone (and even if it is considered a given that every state, that 
every foundation itself is founded in violence, and is by definition unable 
to justify itself), I have a great many reasons to believe that it is for the 
best, all things considered, and in the interests of the greatest number of 
people, including the Palestinians, including the other states in the region, 
to consider this foundation, despite its originary violence, as henceforth 
irreversible—on the condition that neighbourly relations be established 
either with a Palestinian state endowed with all its rights, in the fullest 
sense of the term, ‘state’ (at least insofar as anything remains of this full 
sense and of sovereignty in general; another very serious question I must 
leave aside for now while briefly relating, in an interview, a telephone 
interview), or, at the centre of the same ‘sovereign’ and binational ‘state’, 
with a Palestinian people freed from all oppression or from all intolerable 
segregation. I have no particular hostility in principle toward the state of 
Israel, but I have almost always judged quite harshly the policies of the 
Israeli governments in relation to the Palestinians. I have often said so 
publicly, in particular in Jerusalem, for example, in a lecture I gave quite a 
long time ago, which was published in more than one language, during the 
period when one spoke of ‘occupied territories’ etc. After a few more 
sentences along these lines, I heard on the other end of the line: ‘I see. 
Well, that’s what I suspected.’7 
 
Despite their lack of understanding and their pre-judgment, one can at least be 
grateful to Derrida’s unnamed telephonic interrogator, for we have here another 
explicit account of his position (not a neutral term in Derrida8) on the place of Israel-
Palestine: an affirmation of demilitarization, the irreversibility of the foundation of 
the state of Israeli (justified through a logic of ‘for the best’, of the least bad 
outcome9) and an articulation of the necessity of either a two-state solution with full 
sovereign Palestinian rights or a single ‘binational’ state solution in which Palestinian 
citizens share equal rights in a shared sovereignty,10 without allowing the violence of 
present and past Israeli governments to pass without criticism and reproach. He goes 
on to tell Roudinesco that his conversation with the mother of the Sorbonne student 
continued:  
 
You no doubt know that I am Jewish; I can feel a deep compassion, even a 
certain solidarity with the inhabitants of this region and with the historical 
victims (Jewish and Palestinians) of the atrocities of these times. But I insist 
on having the right to criticize all the governmental policies, including those 
of the great powers, dating from before and ever since the foundation of the 
state of Israel. I do not believe I am giving in to any anti-Semitism by saying 
this, and, as I have written elsewhere, I even dare to be more faithful than ever 
to a heritage, a demand for justice that some, rightly or wrongly, do not 
hesitate to consider essentially Jewish. (FWT119) 
 
If we have allowed Derrida to speak on this topic, quoting at length without the usual 
academic protocol of the cut or the summation, it is to show or represent (for the 
question here is ‘how to show this?’) the direct idiom in which Derrida is both precise 
and clear on his interest in this matter. One might note the difference in tone between 
the way in which Derrida speaks on this topic and other moments in Derrida’s 
writing, which we might identify with either a more philosophical or literary 
vocabulary. In this sense, the interest and the urgency, that returns again and again as 
if it were an obsession, is a considered articulation of what Derrida means when he 
talks of the sovereign, the state, the Judaic, the Abrahamic, and so on in other 
contexts.11 The interest that might distinguish Derrida from other thinkers from the 
Arab world might be his adherence to the need to affirm and guarantee the foundation 
of the Israeli state but he is equally open to either a redefinition of its borders or a 
more complex sharing of sovereignty between two self-determined peoples. Far from 
being a ‘Heideggerian quietist’ position, this is in reality a more meaningful and 
bolder statement than you will find in many of Derrida’s Parisian peers or western 
governments and even the United Nations.12  
 
Derrida concludes his discussion with Roudinesco by noting that he cannot elaborate 
this problematic further but he has written about it elsewhere. One might think of the 
text on Sartre in Judeities, the postcard from Ramallah in Counterpath, and ‘Message 
de Jacques Derrida’ (Message from Jacques Derrida), his contribution, as part of a 
delegation of the International Parliament of Writers invited to the Occupied 
Territories in the spring of 2002, which first appeared in the collection of essays Le 
Voyage en Palestine in 2002.13 There is also the late text ‘Avowing—The Impossible, 
‘Returns’, Repentance, and ‘Reconciliation: a lesson’ first given as a lecture at UC 
Santa Barbara in 2003. As Derrida develops the idea of the ‘vivre ensemble’ [living 
together] one could cut almost at random into this essay to evidence or represent the 
continued consistency and elaboration of Derrida’s clearly articulated thought on 
Palestine and Israel. He writes of his Algerian childhood, his experiences of anti-
Semitism but also his ambivalence to both Algerian nationalism and French 
occupation as appropriation of the place: 
It pushes the said child not only to oppose, sometimes publicly, the 
politics of the current Israeli government and of a great number of those 
that preceded it, but also to continue to interrogate himself in the most 
insomniac fashion regarding the conditions in which the modern state of 
Israel established itself. If there is a place where I do not have the right to 
hide this, it is here. I hasten immediately to add at least two things: (1) 
That one can remain radically critical in this regard without implying 
thereby any threatening or disrespectful consequences for the present, the 
future, and the existence of Israel, on the contrary; (2) that I have been 
able to perceive, and to rejoice at this during my last visit to Israel and to 
Palestine, that these questions, these ‘returns’ (reflections, repentances, 
conscious realizations) upon certain founding violences are today more 
frequent and declared by certain Israelis, citizens and authentic patriots, 
and by new historians of the state of Israel, the ones and the others having 
decided to draw political consequences from this return to the past, as 
some Palestinians do as well.14 
 
Once again we witness the solidarity with scholars in Israel and Palestine prepared to 
question and to criticize the received violence of the state of Israel and of the state of 
its history, without giving up on the possibility of a recovery of the opportunity 
afforded by the founding promise of that state. This is the place Derrida occupies, his 
occupied territory as it were around the question and interrogation of the state, in 
every sense, of Israel. The interest is clearly stated over three decades in public 
writing that is significant in its clarity and precision. ‘I know that what interests me 
always takes (its/his) place over there, but how to show that?’ One way to show it is 
sometimes the most obvious, by an unambiguous public articulation; the irony of 
which might be, given the seeming confusion entertained by many on this topic, that 
the best way to obscure something is not to inter or bury it, but to hide it in plain 
sight.15   
 
If we were to ask what interests Derrida about this place, the answer is ‘clear’, even if 
the politics of the Middle East are anything but ‘clear’. It would seem that the greater 
the opacity, and the greater the concentration and entanglement, the clearer Derrida’s 
prose becomes. In the face of increasing mediatic obfuscation and political 
complexity, Derrida’s writing on this topic retains a commitment to precision. This 
may appear at first glance to be another kind of Derrida, one who speaks clearly as if 
to avoid the absence of doubt. It might be said that doubt is the place of 
deconstruction, the cultivation of doubt, that holds open the possibility of questioning 
the given. However, a commitment to doubt does not have to be imprecise. On the 
contrary, such a dedication to doubt as a principle requires a rigorous logic and 
philosophical exactitude. For the absence of doubt, deconstruction adheres to the 
necessary possibility of doubt. This would be a deconstruction that also doubted the 
possibility of doubt; it might say ‘doubt, if there is any’. By placing doubt in doubt it 
would trouble the place of doubt as the proper place of a deconstruction. Doubt, if it 
were to be thought or practised, would not necessarily be defined in relation to 
ambiguity, uncertainty, obscurity or caveat (categories used to qualify or clarify 
doubt). Rather, a doubt worthy of the name would be ruined from the start by this 
commitment to clarification that clearly rests in its transparent centre. An adherence 
to doubt cannot then be reduced to a question of style; rather style or rhetoric itself is 
both the avowal of doubt and its clarification, the undoing of doubt by its own clarity. 
There is then no choice to be made between the Derrida of Glas and the Derrida of his 
writing on ‘Israel-Palestine’, whatever interests him takes its place over there. 
 
If we were to ask what is Derrida’s interest in this place, that might prove a more 
difficult interrogation. Towards the end of ‘Avowing—The Impossible’ he writes of 
his visit to the cemetery in Jerusalem in 1982, a date close to Genet’s work on 
Prisoner of Love. At the cemetery the officials make decisions about who has the 
right to be buried in Jerusalem and take calls and offers of money from all over the 
world, notably the United States. Even before the epoch of digital telecommunication 
it was clear to Derrida on this occasion that Jerusalem was a switchboard for a global 
conjuration that matched the task of living together with the prospect of dying 
together and even rising again together. He notes: 
New York could appear closer than Gaza (with or without airport), and I 
could have the feeling of being closer to some other at the other end of the 
world than to some neighbor, some friend from West Jerusalem or East 
Jerusalem. To ask oneself then, on a cell phone, whether Jerusalem is in 
Jerusalem, is perhaps no longer to trust, like others in older times, the 
distinction between earthly Jerusalem and heavenly Jerusalem. Yet this 
place of promise appeared to resist substitution and telecommunication. 
What was signified then, by the placing of this ‘taking place’ 
[l’emplacement de cet ‘avoir lieu’]? And of this messianic taking-place? 
  But I asked myself first, in anguish—and it was the same 
question: Who can allocate places? Who can authorize himself, while 
avowing it, to grant here, to refuse there, to grant to one and refuse to the 
other the chance to make this place his place, to elect it or to believe 
himself elected to it, be it in order there to bury his dead or there to await 
some messianic peace, a to-come or a return? (AI41) 
 
When we read these words from Derrida on the place of place in the psychic terrain of 
onto-thanto-theological-nationalism, and read them back against the 1974 text of Glas 
on ‘what interests me always takes (its/his) place over there’, we might consider the 
importance of place, situation and position in Derrida’s thought and political 
articulations. In a 2009 book, Derrida, Africa and the Middle East, written in the 
years after Derrida’s death, Christopher Wise characterizes Derrida’s interest in Israel 
as ‘latent Jewish liberalism’ that unconsciously privileges Zionism, in particular 
criticizing Derrida’s notion of the ‘war for the appropriation of Jerusalem’ as an 
effacement of the colonial occupation of the historic city of Al-Quds: ‘Derrida’s 
dramatization of religion’s recent return (…) fails to respect Christianity and Islam in 
their irreducible difference from Judaism, a classically imperialist gesture in which 
the Other is rewritten as a lesser or inauthentic version of oneself.’ Or later, ‘when 
Derrida states that “[the war for the appropriation of Jerusalem] is happening 
everywhere”, he does more than simply indulge in hyperbole, he distorts the basic 
facts of Palestinian-Israeli history’.16 In fact Derrida had already begun to formulate 
the idea of the war for the appropriation of Jerusalem in Glas, when he writes in the 
passage with which we began, of the ‘limits of a basin, a sea, where there arrive for an 
interminable war the Greek, the Jew, the Arab, the Hispano-Moor [l’Hispano-
Mauresque]’. Here the basin in questions is both the so-called ‘Holy Basin’ of the old 
city of Jerusalem that locates the holy sites common to Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, and the Mediterranean basin and sea from where the Abrahamic tradition 
spreads out as the diaspora of absolute knowledge qua Europe, home to the Greek, the 
Morrano, and the interminable war of the monotheisms.17 
 
Wise is a card-carrying non-reader whose experience of ‘reading’ Derrida seems to be 
limited to the opening chapters of Spectres of Marx.18 When Derrida speaks of the 
‘war for the appropriation of Jerusalem’, he is referring, as he does in ‘Avowing—
The Impossible’, to a contest and polemos for the appropriation of the idea of 
Jerusalem as a gesture of global politics in which there are those who feel themselves 
qualified to allocate places, to authorize themselves, to grant or to refuse to the other 
the chance to make ‘this place’ his place, to believe themselves elected to it, of which 
Christopher Wise’s argument would be just another example of the interment of 
thought. Wise is not only a poor reader of the book on Marx but also fails to 
understand the argument of The Gift of Death [Donner la Mort] from the previous 
year, 1992. 
 
Wise is not open to doubt, he authorizes himself to economize sacrifice, weighing one 
suffering against another, in order to put Derrida in his place, and to take his own 
definitive place in the history of reading Derrida by adopting what might be described 
as a difficult position, accusing Derrida of subordinating ‘non-Jewish peoples, 
especially Palestinian Christians and Muslims, to [his] own idiosyncratic logic’ (58).  
In The Gift of Death Derrida outlines a reasoning of sacrifice in which, as David Wills 
translates it in a famous formulation, ‘every other (one) is every (bit) other’ [tout 
autre est tout autre]. This has been most keenly taken up through the example of the 
cats of Paris, the animal being more fashionable these days in the Western academy 
than the politics of the Middle East, whereby Derrida asks ‘how could you ever justify 
the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home 
every morning for years, whereas cats die of hunger at every instant?’19 In other 
words, how can you justify attention to the singular or exemplary when there are so 
many equally or even more worthy examples of suffering that have a call on our 
responsibility to act? This is a powerful provocation that does not dismiss the absolute 
sacrifice to the other but recognizes the imperative duty that binds us to the other as 
singularity ‘in favour of another absolutely imperative duty binding me to every 
other’. It is the starting point for, say, Derrida’s thinking on the Shoa or Auschwitz 
that does not belittle the examples but considers it no more exemplary than any other 
example in a necessary general thinking of suffering and the political.20  
 
The Gift of Death, immediately prior to the often-cited short passage on cats, offers a 
clear and more significant example of this logic, spread over several pages, as the 
question of the appropriation of Jerusalem, characterized as just one of ‘all the Mount 
Moriahs of this world’ (68) a place where the self-declared elect feel authorized to 
calculate and measure the value of individual sacrifice in a clear and transparent way, 
where precision becomes calculation. It would be cathartic for Christopher Wise to 
read what Derrida actually says: 
According to 2 Chronicles, 3 and 8, the place where this occurs, where the 
sacrifice of Abraham or of Isaac (and it is the sacrifice of both of them, it 
is the gift of death one makes to the other in putting oneself to death, 
mortifying oneself in order to make a gift of this death as a sacrificial 
offering to God) takes place, this place where death is given or offered, is 
the place where Solomon decided to build the House of the Lord in 
Jerusalem, also the place where God appeared to Solomon’s father, David. 
However, it is also the place where the grand Mosque of Jerusalem stood, 
the place called the Dome of the Rock near the grand Aksa mosque where 
the sacrifice of Ibrahim is supposed to have taken place and from where 
Muhammad mounted his horse for paradise after his death. It is just above 
the destroyed temple of Jerusalem and the Wailing Wall, not far from the 
Way of the Cross. It is therefore a holy place but also a place that is in 
dispute, radically and rabidly, fought over by all the monotheisms, by all 
the religions of the unique and transcendent God, of the absolute other. 
These three monotheisms fight over it, it is useless to deny this in terms of 
some wide-eyed ecumenism; they make war with fire and blood, have 
always done so and all the more fiercely today, each claiming its 
particular perspective on this place and claiming an original historical and 
political interpretation of Messianism and of the sacrifice of Isaac. The 
reading, interpretation, and tradition of the sacrifice of Isaac are 
themselves sites of bloody, holocaustic sacrifice. Isaac’s sacrifice 
continues every day. Countless machines of death wage a war that has no 
front. There is no front between responsibility and irresponsibility but 
only between different appropriations of the same sacrifice, different 
orders of responsibility, different other orders… Sacrificial war rages not 
only among the religions of the Book and the races of Abraham that 
expressly refer to the sacrifice of Isaac, Abraham, or Ibrahim, but between 
them and the rest of the starving world, within the immense majority of 
humankind and even those living (not to mention the others, dead or 
nonliving, dead or not yet born) who don’t belong to the people of 
Abraham or Ibrahim, all those others to whom the names of Abraham and 
Ibrahim have never meant anything because such names don’t conform or 
correspond to anything. (69−70) 
 
This is anything but ‘latent Jewish Liberalism’, whatever that might mean. It is a 
radical challenge to thinking that both identifies the war for the appropriation of 
Jerusalem as exemplary of a global war to appropriate the secret of sacrifice and so 
the right to measure and compare individual suffering, and is itself an effect of that 
war in which the monotheisms of Islam, Judaism and Christianity use the exemplarity 
of the contest for Jerusalem to wage war on others on other Mount Moriahs of the 
world. This is not to say, that for Derrida Jerusalem-Al-Quds is merely an instance for 
reflection, dismissible as ‘faults on both sides’, leading to a wider philosophical truth. 
Rather, this argument that is central to much of Derrida’s writing from here on in, 
should be read alongside the passages and texts quoted above on the singularity and 
historical specificity of moments in the history of two peoples occupying one place in 
which there is no front between responsibility and irresponsibility, only the absolute 
irresponsibility of taking responsibility for that place over others and the risk of a total 
irresponsibility that measured one other’s suffering more worthy than the other.  
 
Derrida does not fail to mention the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham in Glas. One can 
find here in the Derrida of 1974 one of the most arresting sentences to be found in his 
entire corpus when he writes apropos of Isaac and Abraham, ‘Circumcision and the 
sacrifice of Isaac are analogous gestures’ (E42a). What follows in Glas is a rich 
reading of Genesis 22 in relation to Hegel’s own account, which if followed in its 
entirety would give rise to another full paper as yet another necessary gloss on Glas.  
To go too quickly in order to sketch out a familiar Derridean schema taking 
preliminary shape in 1974, both circumcision and sacrifice appear under the sign of 
castration; ‘both signify the curtailing, the cut, the transcendence, the absence, the 
subordination of love’ (E42a). For Derrida all this ‘stands out clearly [tranché]’ in 
Hegel’s reading, which offers castration as an ‘economic simulacrum’ that gives rise 
to the general conceptual structure of the Aufhebung. At stake in the progression of 
Hegel’s thought on the structure of castration is the fate of the idealism of speculative 
dialectics. One might wish to intervene in this account of 1974 to suggest that while 
analogous in the thought of a Hegel, circumcision, sacrifice and castration are not 
straightforwardly the same thing or even equivalent things in the more fully 
developed reading of the binding of Isaac that we find twenty years later in Derrida’s 
The Gift of Death.  In an economy of sacrifice (and interrupted sacrifice at that) 
between circumcision, castration and oblation, one can take one’s pick without 
necessarily escaping a conceptual order but nevertheless the depth of the cut offers 
different possible outcomes. For Hegel, Abraham’s service to God leads to the 
reconstitution of a family ‘which has become much stronger—and an infinitely 
privileged nation, raised above the others, separated from the others. But the privilege 
of this mastery stays abstract, thus simultaneously inverts itself into its contrary: the 
privilege implies an absolute slavery with respect to God, an infinite heteronomy. The 
Jewish reign is a reign of death; it destroys the life of other national families, 
commands from out of its very own death, symbolized by the submission to a 
transcendent, jealous, exclusive, miserly, presentless god’ (E44a). The unhappy 
consciousness of the Jewish multitude for Hegel isolates the nation around the 
demand to be alone with their God, and in so doing does not easily reserve the 
immeasurable for itself but instead only serves to recognize the equal rights of others 
and their gods as nations outside of itself. How clear any of this is in Hegel is open to 
question, although it is clearly one of the many things that interests Derrida in the 
place of Israel-Palestine. As with the writing on Palestine we recognize as 
idiomatically different to Glas, Derrida’s intent here in reading the path of the 
dialectic through the story of Abraham is not merely to question a concept but to 
‘question the form of the question that is arranged in the conceptual instance in 
general’ (E44a). In Glas this takes the form of a matrixial deconstruction of Hegel and 
Genet across two columns as the undoing of the ambition of absolute knowledge; in 
the writing on Palestine it takes the form of a precise questioning of a singular place 
that offers the resources of the aporia of clarity and doubt as a further resistance to 
absolute ambitions. There may be a difference in how Derrida chooses to show ‘what 
remains’ in both texts but the gestures are similar, as he writes in Glas: ‘forces 
resistant to the Aufhebung, to the process of truth, to speculative negativity must be 
made to appear [how to show it?], and as well that these forces of resistance do not 
constitute in their turn relievable or relieving negativities’ (E43a). What remains 
within the dialectic as the fundamentally undialectisable, and how to show it, are 
stakes that run across all the idioms of Derrida’s writing, finding a place of singular 
interest in the question of Palestine and everything that falls out from it, which is to 
say a great many things. 
 
In his essay on Genet, Said writes ‘There is a brief allusion in Glas to our encounter at 
Reid Hall in Paris, although I’ve always been slightly miffed that Derrida should refer 
to me only anonymously, as “un ami” who brought him news of Genet.’21 It is not 
clear why Said is ‘miffed’. Is it because he wanted to be cited in Glas, avowed as it 
were, given his place or given his place back to him, identifying the question of 
Palestine as his place, as part of the Genet-Said story, in preference to being buried in 
the text having had his name sacrificed for anonymity (arrested, drawn back, bridled)? 
Or is it because in writing Glas and writing back to Sartre’s appropriation of Genet 
for existentialism Derrida seems in his own way to appropriate Genet and the 
Palestinians for himself? In this sense, Glas would represent something of a 
philosophical land grab on Derrida’s part. Something that Derrida recognizes in his 
own commentary, in a moment in which he returns late in the column to the mode of 
address we first encountered in our opening passage: 
He will be furious with me [m’en vouloir à mort] for all sorts of reasons I 
will not take time to enumerate. And at all events and cases. If I support or 
valorize his text, he will see in this a sort of approbation, verily of 
magisterial, university, paternal or maternal appropriation. It is as if I 
were stealing his erection from him. (E199b) 
 
In the absence of Genet, Derrida, and Said, we can only speculate on this purloined 
phallus and what becomes of it when it is passed from hand to hand. Perhaps, to be 
prosaic, Derrida’s reticence in naming names here is predicated on the most ethical of 
motives in a time of danger in the career of a Genet and the Palestinian cause. 
However, equally, and I would suggest more compellingly, if there is an allusion in 
Glas to this meeting between Derrida and Said then it is a very well-hidden one. I 
have read and re-read the right-hand column searching for it but the scene does not 
seem to exist (I accept the possibility that my own reading might be willfully blind to 
the faux-amis). I can find no reference to news delivered by a friend on the 
whereabouts of Genet. This suggests either that Said had not actually read Glas and is 
referring here to something reported to him by ‘a friend’, or, that in writing his text on 
Genet, Said is mis-remembering the exact nature of the allusion in Glas.  This might 
lead us to speculate that Said may in fact be referring to the very passage with which 
we began. Here Derrida does not say that he had spoken to Genet, but rather that ‘he 
let me know’ [il m’a fait savoir] that he was in Beirut. This is as close as we get in 
Glas to a suggestion of a communication between Genet and Derrida. Perhaps, to 
speculate, Edward Said was the facteur who delivered a message from one to the 
other, with Said’s memoir offering itself as the place where this destinerrance takes its 
place, the site in which the letter arrives otherwise. Perhaps Glas, despite 
appearances, is also a place in which the letter of Genet arrives in another context: ‘if 
I write for his text, I write against him, if I write for him, I write against his text. The 
friendship is irreconcilable’ (E200b). Such moments of meta-commentary 
characterize both columns of Glas; in the case of Genet there is a specific context in 
which Derrida is stealing the genie from Sartre’s cave of wonders, and according to 
Said, disavowing a specific route of escape. However, the Derrida of Glas seems to be 
fully aware of the possibility of a reading that establishes a misreading that upholds 
the rigor of truth: ‘do I write for him? What would I like to do to him? Do to his 
“work”? Ruin it by erecting it, perhaps’. In appropriating a certain Genet, Derrida 
appears to be fully aware that the academic and philosophical monumentalisation of 
Genet, by what he called in his Jerusalem address the ‘institutions of interpretation’, is 
the ruin of the writer and the thief, turning pleasure into work, to undo unto others as 
one would undo unto one’s self, perhaps; one might reflect, for example, on the 
peeling monument of Derrida Studies today. Equally, we recall that whatever happens 
in his/its place, interests Derrida. The one who is repeatedly concerned by the 
otherwise, including the socialist, other origins of Israel.  
 
There is no place to land here, other than that explicitly, singularly, clearly, laid out 
by Derrida in a radical transparency. Such a space is not without complication or 
doubt. When so much is at stake in the North American academy, which is to say the 
global academy, metonymically speaking, today, one might say that the question of 
Israel-Palestine and its deconstruction remains essential today beyond a simple 
either/or, and beyond a simple ‘Derrida says’, but must be rather the living place of a 
theoretical practice that we have come to recognize in reading Derrida among the 
Palestinians. 
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